The minuscule number of Americans who take even a cursory glance, let alone a concerted gaze, at their nation’s fantastically expensive strategic weapons programs quickly run into the wall of secrecy that keeps all but a few officials in near total darkness. Even the Congressional Research Service, tasked with informing members of Congress about such arcane subjects, is only able to compile shallow reports of little practical use. Many hundreds of billions of dollars are at stake, but we must believe that a handful of Annapolis, West Point, or Colorado Springs graduates and their industry dependents are wise managers of this treasure. Longtime observers know that the historical evidence is not encouraging.
In October 2015, the Air Force awarded a contract to Northrop Grumman to build a new strategic bomber, dubbed the B-21 “Raider”, with the following (unclassified) funding profile, according to the CRS:
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The money until FY2009 was just for R&D. Then the program was paused for two years while the Obama administration pondered its necessity. It made up for lost time after that. CRS essentially throws up its hands in frustration when trying to evaluate these numbers, because so few technical details have been revealed. Too, although the B-21 is one of the Air Force’s largest projects, the bomber is being managed and paid for through what CRS calls “nontraditional means,” namely something known as the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, “a much smaller program office than typical for such a significant program.” That is, even fewer eyes than usual. CRS could not even determine whether formal acquisition milestone certifications of the technology were being carried out. They do know that the development contract is cost-plus, one of the classic horrors of military procurement. Northrop Grumman’s winning bid came in so far below Pentagon estimates that it raised the specter of old-fashioned “buying in,” a defense industry tradition. “Congress may wish to revisit DOD’s cost estimation to understand why the estimated cost was significantly higher than the actual bid,” CRS politely suggests. “In addition, Congress may wish to use its oversight mechanisms to verify that the contract can be executed at the price bid.” The outlook is not auspicious: “Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the FY2017 defense authorization bill included requirements that DOD disclose the total cost of the B-21. However, those provisions did not appear in the final conference report.” So it goes.
Finally, the CRS points out, most of the B-21 program is classified at the Special Access level, above Top Secret. “Due to the size of the B-21 program, its implications for defense budgeting, and other issues like the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy, the B-21 may attract interest from Members not typically involved in such issues. Congress may wish to consider whether such Members’ interests require a greater level of access to program data, or whether the issues can be adequately addressed under current rules.” If past is prelude, this is about as likely as making those numbers in Table 1 match the reality of a blank check.
